- The Allocation of Scientific Talent, (accepted) The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. (see here for the working paper version).
- Does Group Inclusion Hurt Financial Inclusion? Evidence from Ultra-Poor Members of Ugandan Savings Groups, (2017) joint with Alfredo Burlando. Journal of Development Economics, 128: 24–48 (see here for the working paper version).
- The Technological Determinants of Long-Run Inequality (2017) Journal of Public Economic Theory. (see here for the working paper version).
- The Allocation of Capital in Rural Credit Markets, (2016) joint with Alfredo Burlando. Journal of International Development, 28 (8): 1381–1395 (see here for the working paper version).
- Focusing Effect and the Poverty Trap (2015) European Economic Review, 76: 222–238 (see here for the working paper version).
- Incomplete Agreements and Context-Dependent
Preferences. Joint with Heiko Karle (supersedes an earlier version titled The Structure of Negotiations: Incomplete Agreements and the Focusing Effect)
- Learning Within or Outside Firms? Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship. Joint with Patrick Legros (supersedes an earlier version titeld The Value of Entrepreneurial Failures: Task Allocation and Career Concerns)
- Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (paper coming soon)
Abstract: Unlike traditional open-source projects, developers of open-source blockchain-based projects can reap large financial rewards thanks to a modern form of seignorage. I study to what extent this novel form of financing generates incentives to innovate. I consider a developer working on an open-source blockchain-based protocol that can be used only in conjunction with a protocol-specific crypto-token. This token is first sold to investors via an auction (the ICO phase) and then traded on a frictionless financial market. I establish that seignorage is effective at generating incentives to develop the protocol. The strength of these incentives is however limited by the fact that, in all equilibria of the game, in each post-ICO period there is a positive probability that the developer sells all his tokens and that, as a consequence, no development occurs.